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Paper presented at the annual conference of The International Society of Military Ethics, 
University of San Diego, January 26-29, 2010. Conference topic: Ethics and Irregular Warfare.  
This presentation is also posted at http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME10/Linden10.pdf. 
 
Abstract 
This presentation explores the significance of just military preparedness (JMP), or jus ante 
bellum as a new category of just war theory, for just war thinking, especially with regard to 
irregular warfare. It articulates six just military preparedness (JMP) principles. It further 
discusses how America’s military preparation fails the JMP principles and how this negatively 
impacts its capability to justly initiate, execute, and conclude (irregular) war. This critical 
analysis takes as its point of departure (former) Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s view that the 
Pentagon needs to be “reprogrammed” toward a “balanced strategy” of preparing for both 
conventional and irregular warfare. 
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Just Military Preparedness and Irregular Warfare 
 
In several recent papers, I have argued that just war theory (JWT) is in need of a fourth category 
of just war thinking (in addition to jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum) with its own 
principles (van der Linden, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). I call this category “just military 
preparedness,” or, in line with the commonly used naming of the other JWT categories, it may be 
called jus potentia ad bellum, or, more briefly (but less accurately), jus ante bellum. Military 
preparedness raises two types of justice concerns. First, we may raise questions about whether 
the military preparation of a country is just toward its military personnel, places a fair burden on 
the civilian population, reflects adequate civilian control, and the like. Second, we may raise 
questions about whether the military preparation of a country is such that it is conducive to the 
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country resorting to force only when justice is on its side as well as to executing and concluding 
war in a just manner. My ultimate concern is military preparedness that is just in the second 
sense – that is, how should we prepare for the possibility of military conflicts so that wars will be 
only justly initiated, executed, and concluded? However, since military preparedness that lacks 
justice in the first sense will be an obstacle to realizing justice in the second sense, my JMP 
principles also aim at addressing justice in the first sense. 
 My main focus in this paper is to explore the significance of JMP for just war thinking, 
especially with regard to irregular warfare. I will proceed as follows. First, I will state six just 
military preparedness (JMP) principles and briefly explicate each of them in general (rather than 
with regard to irregular warfare only). Next, I will discuss how America’s military preparation 
fails the JMP principles and how this negatively impacts its capability to justly initiate, execute, 
and conclude (irregular) war. My point of departure here will be Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates’s view that the Pentagon needs to be “reprogrammed” toward a “balanced strategy” of 
preparing for both conventional and irregular warfare. 
 
I. Just Military Preparedness Principles  
1. The basic defense structure of a country, should accord with its general purpose of using 
military force only for the sake of protecting people against massive human rights infringements 
caused by large-scale armed violence. 
 Explication: It is widely accepted that national self-defense, assisting an ally in its national self-
defense, and protecting a population against genocide are just causes for war. This first JMP 
principle assumes that the rational core of these causes is that resort to force is only justified to 
protect against massive human rights violations. Notably, mere violation of territorial integrity is 
not an adequate cause for resort to force (cf. May 2008, 103). Terrorist acts typically require 
police action, not a military response (Cortright and Lopez 2007). The principle requires weapon 
systems appropriate to the tasks of human rights protection by force. Most obviously, this means 
that nuclear weapons should be abolished and that a weaponization of space should be avoided 
(Van der Linden 2010). The principle also requires a defensive military posture, not global 
power projection (Van der Linden, 2009a). 
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2. Military personnel should be trained with this general purpose in mind and participate in 
moral decision-making concerning the initiation and execution of military force.  
 
Explication: The military as experts of human rights protection by force should be experts in 
avoiding excessive force. Current military training in the United States falls short in this regard. 
Timothy Challans (2007, 24) writes: “The vast majority of military students I have personally 
taught in the classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. [M]ost justify [an] exorbitant 
degree of collateral damage…harsh and coercive interrogation measures [and] they are more 
than willing to err on the side of excessive force.” In the words of Challans (2007, 186), the 
second JMP principle also requires the existence of “legitimate avenues of public reason and 
disagreement, dissent, and disobedience within the war machine.” Increased moral competency 
among military personnel reduces the risk of wrong resort to force, protracted unjust wars, and 
the erroneous continuation of (an otherwise just) military conflict. A corollary is that military 
personnel should have a full right to selective conscientious refusal.  
 
3. The way that the military draws its personnel from the population at large must reflect that 
preparation for, and possible execution of, resort to military force is a collective choice and 
enterprise that impacts the moral standing of all citizens of a society and should be expressive of 
their values.  
 
Explication: In a democratic society, resort to force should reflect the will of the people and the 
moral burdens of war should ultimately rest with the people. A military that is culturally, socio-
economically, ethnically (and so on) not reflective of the citizenry is more likely to engage in 
alienated wars defined as wars that are fought in the name of  the people but are not viewed by 
the people as an expression of their will and responsibility (cf. Ryan 2008). Resort to force 
becomes easier with an alienated military (Bacevitch 2005). The principle requires an end to the 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy within the American military. Similarly, there should be a full 
integration of women into combat units.  
 
4. Priority should be given to nonmilitary means of preventing massive human rights violations 
caused by armed force. 
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Explication: As President Obama noted in his Acceptance Speech of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, 
“no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy … [it] is never glorious, and we must 
never trumpet it as such.” Accordingly, priority should be given to prevent threats from 
materializing rather to meet them militarily. Few politicians do not pay lip service to this point; 
however, it is as widely acknowledged in theory as it is ignored in practice. 
 
5. The value of security (against the threat of massive human rights violations by armed force) 
and the resources committed to this value must be balanced against other human values (e.g., 
education and health) and the resources set aside for their realization.  
 
Explication: The growing nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War illustrate that increased 
military spending may make us less secure, but even increased spending that contributes to our 
security must be questioned in light of both its opportunity and actual costs. Two public policy 
issues that have recently received much attention exemplify the significance of the fifth JMP 
principle: military preparation, not to speak of actual war, is costly in terms of global warming, 
while the increasing resources spent on the military during the past decade must be questioned in 
terms of the resources needed to provide basic health care to all Americans.1 
 
6. Matters of military preparedness should be settled by a competent authority with right 
intention (e.g., military preparedness for human rights protection, not for profit and employment 
opportunities).  
 
Explication: In a democratic society, the representatives of the people should be this competent 
authority, requiring them to communicate openly and honestly with the citizens about the costs 
and benefits of competing JMP proposals. The defense budget should be transparent to the 
 
1 Arguably, several ten-thousands Americans die prematurely every year due to lack of health insurance. 
See http://www.factcheck.org/2009/09/dying-from-lack-of-insurance/. Of course, there are other ways of 
addressing this situation besides shifting tax dollars from defense to public health care, but to question 
defense allocation from this perspective has the merit that it might put a dent in the habitual support of 
politicians and the public at large for the Pentagon budgets. 
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representatives and they should allocate resources free from pressures of weapons manufacturers, 
local employment opportunities, and the like. 
 
II. Seeking Balance: the Small Picture  
 
As suggested in my brief explications of the JMP principles, I hold that the United States fails to 
satisfy the JPM principles and so clearly falls short of just military preparedness. In a way, this is 
hardly a radical view. In “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates makes a variety of critical observations about the military 
preparation planning of the Pentagon that underline to some extent that the United States fails to 
satisfy the JMP principles, even though Gates would undoubtedly be critical of my specific 
interpretation and explication of the JMP principles. On his account, the Pentagon presently fails 
to strike a proper balance between allocating resources for ongoing wars, maintaining 
conventional military superiority, and developing greater counterinsurgency capabilities (Gates 
2009, 1-2).2 The main problem is that the Pentagon is wedded to fighting conventional wars 
rather than committed to fighting the irregular wars that the United States increasingly has fought 
in the recent past (since the end of the Cold war) and will increasingly fight in the immediate 
future. Gates (2009, 2) writes: “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply 
embedded in the Defense Department’s budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in 
Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support – 
including in the Pentagon – for the capabilities needed to win today’s wars and some of their 
likely successors.” Gates (2009, 6) notes that one aspect of this conventional orientation of the 
Pentagon is that its weapon systems “have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more 
costly, are taking longer to build and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities.” Gates 
(2009, 7) adds that American soldiers paid a price for this high-tech fixation, posing the 
rhetorical question, “why was it necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get 
the [low-tech] capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars?” 
 In short, Gates’s observations confirm that the American military preparation violates the 
sixth JMP principle, the competent and right authority principle, and show that as a result the 
 
2 Page references are made to the electronic copy (10 pages) of Gates’s article in the Academic Search 
Premier database. 
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first JMP principle is also violated. After all, inadequate preparation for irregular warfare means 
inadequate preparation for how to use force to protect people from massive human rights 
violations through asymmetric violence. Interestingly, Gates even suggests (indirectly, to be 
sure) that current military preparation fails in terms of the second JMP principle. He writes: “The 
United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to 
clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward” (2009, 4). Gates (2009, 4) notes that 
“impressive strides” have been made in better equipping and training military personnel for this 
purpose. Yet, at the same time, there are “cultural traits” within the American military blocking 
progress in this regard. Notably, “we should look askance at idealist, triumphalist, or 
ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to transcend the immutable principles and ugly 
realities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission, 
instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block” 
(Gates 2009, 9-10).  
 Even though I hold that Gates is correct that American military preparedness must partly 
shift from conventional warfare to irregular warfare and that institutional and cultural changes 
are necessary for this purpose, I disagree with his understanding and explication of irregular 
warfare. Once we define conflicts between states fought by their armies as regular warfare and 
define all other military acts as irregular warfare, we end up with a notion of irregular warfare 
that may obscure important distinctions. On this definition, supporting fighters against an 
oppressive regime, fighting insurgents who challenge our occupation of a foreign country, 
combating militarily global terrorists who have declared war on the United States, and 
intervening in an unfolding genocide in a failed state are all forms of irregular warfare. The 
moral issues raised in each case, however, are rather different; the military training needed might 
differ in the various cases; and even the kind of military equipment necessary for optimal 
execution might not be the same. Accordingly, the issue is not merely to balance preparation for 
irregular and conventional warfare, but to find a proper balance within the preparation for 
irregular warfare (broadly defined). My view is that the first priority should be preparation for 
humanitarian intervention, but I will not try to argue here for this claim. 
 Not surprisingly, Gates says little about how our JMP failure might negatively impact our 
capability to justly initiate, execute, and conclude war. His rejection of “shock and awe” points 
to a link between JMP failure and unjust initiation of force: the fixation on America’s military 
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technological superiority may lead one to fail to take into account all the horrors of resort to 
force with the result that the jus ad bellum principle of proportionality is misapplied. More 
broadly, technologically based triumphalism may lead one to set aside the last resort principle 
and even careful reflection on just cause. Surely, Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on 
technologically based triumphalism with its guiding idea that “Rapid Dominance” could be 
established through “Shock and Awe.” It is worth recalling that Harlan Ullman (2003) predicted 
that “2, 3, 4, 5 days” would suffice for complete victory. Gates might be too optimistic that this 
lesson has been learned, stating that “the United states is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or 
Afghanistan – that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire – anytime 
soon.” But, of course, the catch here is what is meant by “anytime soon?” 
 Furthermore, Gates (2009, 8) bemoans that the improvised transformation of the 
American military in Iraq into an effective counterinsurgency “came at a frightful human, 
financial, and political cost.” It is not clear whether Gates ignores here, as is so often done, the 
human costs to the Iraqis themselves, but, to say the least, the Iraqi civilian suffered not only 
from a drawn-out conflict, as such, but also from an American military violating the jus in bello 
principle of discrimination (due to its failure to satisfy the second JMP principle).3 The 
discrimination problem is also partly caused by the use of inappropriate weapons. Gates might be 
too optimistic about the discriminatory capability of high-teach weapons. He writes: “A button 
can be pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck will explode in Mosul. A bomb 
dropped from the sky can destroy a targeted house while leaving the one next to it intact” (Gates 
2009, 9). But targets are missed, regularly misidentified, or often so blended into a civilian 
setting that unacceptable collateral damage follows. Generally, it is difficult to upkeep the 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants in irregular warfare, especially in 
counterinsurgency. (The problem seems less in humanitarian intervention, underlining my 
previous claim that it is important to make a distinction between various forms of irregular 
warfare.) What adds to the problem is the increasing use of private military contractors (PMCs) 
in irregular wars.  
 Gates is completely silent about PMCs in his plea for a reprogrammed Pentagon. This 
neglect is rather striking in light of the currently indispensable role of PMCs in irregular warfare. 
George R. Lucas, Jr., (2009, 332-33) writes: “It is wholly impossible, at present, to deploy the 
 
3 For an overstated but still valuable account, see Hedges and Al-Arian 2008. 
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military forces of any of our allied [NATO] nations for any purpose whatsoever, without the 
logistical and security support provided by such firms [PMCs) and their contract personnel. This 
is the sobering reality of post-modern [irregular warfare] operations, the full and stark 
significance of which most nations, governments, and their militaries have yet to fully confront.” 
Military preparedness that includes PMCs involves serious violations of the second, third, and 
sixth JMP principles. What leads to the violation of the second JMP principle is that PMCs set 
their own standards of how to train their personnel morally and militarily. The third principle is 
violated because PMCs draw their personnel from numerous nations and have an ethic of profit-
seeking rather than one of service to the nation. And the sixth PMC principle is violated because 
PMC operations are not subject to full democratic oversight and control. The violation of JMP 
principles spills over into violation of traditional just war principles. Military personnel from 
PMCs have engaged in indiscriminate violence, often without paying any price for doing so, and 
their blending with American forces weakens the traditional combatant-noncombatant 
distinction, thus posing additional risks to legitimate noncombatants in armed conflict situations. 
Credible accusations of corruption and bribery of insurgents have been made against PMCs 
operating in Afghanistan (Roston 2009). It might also be case that PMC personnel work together 
with US Special Forces in Pakistan, adding to the problem of inadequate oversight and 
accountability of covert operations in general (Scahill 2009). We must avoid, though, to make 
the PMCs an easy scapegoat since it is ultimately Congress and the Pentagon that allow 
convenient accountability gaps within which various wrongdoings and even war crimes are often 
committed. 
 
III. Seeking Balance: the Big Picture  
 
Gates’s main concern is to create balance within the defense budget, but he also notes that there 
is a misbalance between military spending for the sake of national security and nonmilitary 
spending for the same purpose. He writes in reference to the “war on terror” that “over the long 
term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” Gates (2009, 2) continues: 
“Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures 
aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to 
address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit.” What Gates 
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has in mind here seems not only that there must be a better balance between nonmilitary and 
military measures in fighting a counterinsurgency, but, more broadly, there must be a better 
balance between conflict prevention measures and military measures in general. Accordingly, 
Gates (2009, 4) argues that the budgets of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development need to be increased. In theory, then, there is recognition that the 
fourth JMP principle is violated. The insight is not new among politicians. Even the bellicose 
national Security Doctrine of 2002 (section VII) claims that “including all the world’s poor in an 
expanding circle of development – and opportunity – is a moral imperative and one of the top 
priorities of U.S. international policy” because “a world where some live in comfort and plenty, 
while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable.” In fact, this 
“top priority” receives very modest funding as compared to defense funding, leaving American 
foreign policy militarized. To be sure, budget increases for total foreign operations, including 
economic assistance, have been greater in the past few years than the budget increases for 
defense, but total foreign operations for FY 2010 is still less than 10% of the defense budget and 
economic assistance is less than 5% (Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations, FY 
2010, 1-2).4 This is in sharp contrast to the ratio of official development aid to military spending 
found Western Europe, ranging up toward 50% in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark.  
 Granted that there is a serious misbalance between preventive and defensive security 
measures, it must be concluded that American resort to force has at the outset a moral strike 
against it. Once a country fails to invest adequate resources in war prevention through poverty 
relief, fair trade, and diplomacy and other nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, and instead 
places most resources for security in the military, its claim that its resort to force in a given 
situation was a last resort measure has at the outset greatly diminished plausibility. A credible 
JWT, then, must insist that the United States greatly rebalances its preventive and defensive 
security spending. 
 Considering that more than 50% of all federal discretionary spending is on defense, the 
only viable way to affect a significant rebalancing is to cut defense spending. The fifth JMP 
principle also suggests a need for a reduced military budget. So the question must be asked 
whether there is a convincing justification for the United States spending about half of the 
 
4 I have not taken into account here that the 2010 international affairs request includes financing for 
foreign military (about 10% of the total budget) and that the US military budget is partly located under 
budgets other than that of the defense department. 
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current global military expenditures and outspending its closest competitor (in terms of military 
spending), China, by ratio of approximately 10 to 1. Why do we need to project our military 
power across the world and maintain an “empire of bases” (Johnson 2004)? Some common 
answers are that American military hegemony is necessary for securing access to oil and other 
resources, for expanding or keeping open markets for American corporations, or for creating 
employment opportunities at home. These answers have explanatory merit, but they fail as 
normative justifications (in accordance with the first JMP principle).5 The common moral 
defense is that American military hegemony is necessary to protect freedom and democracy 
across the globe, and that this is ultimately for the sake of our own freedom and democracy at 
home. I think that this defense fails. The American military lacks the authority to play global cop 
and divide the world -- in an act of stunning hubris -- into regions under its command. In 
practice, we all too often engage in imposing freedom and democracy (or something much less 
uplifting) instead of protecting these ideals. Moreover, American wars, even when justly 
initiated, commonly lead to the establishment of permanent military bases in foreign countries, 
often against the local popular will (Lutz 2009). Military hegemony may also make us and our 
closest allies less safe because it has such global security costs as leading to asymmetric attacks 
against the United States and its allies, as well as to nuclear proliferation (Van der Linden, 
2009a, 34-38). Of course, all these claims are controversial and I cannot substantiate them here. 
But these claims show, at least, that the issue of whether America’s recent wars have been justly 
initiated, executed, and concluded cannot be separated from the question of whether America’s 
military preparation is just, thus underlining my main thesis that JWT should add JMP as a new 
category of just war thinking. 
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